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We study centipede games played by an inﬁnite sequence of players. Following the 
literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, 
naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive -equilibrium 
and sophisticated -equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated 
-equilibria for each positive . Under the assumption that the payoff functions are 
upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show that there exist both naive and sophisticated 
0-equilibria in pure strategies. We also compare the probability to stop of a naive versus a 
sophisticated decision maker and show that a sophisticated decision maker stops earlier.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We study centipede games played by an inﬁnite sequence of players. Each player is active only once. The active player 
can choose either to stop the game or to continue. As soon as the active player chooses to stop, the game ends.
One of the main application areas of our model concerns the vast literature on decision making with time-inconsistent 
preferences. It is customary (Strotz, 1955; Pollak, 1968; Peleg and Yaari, 1973; Goldman, 1979) to model a decision maker 
with time-inconsistent preferences as consisting of a sequence of multiple selves, where day t self makes a decision on 
behalf of the decision maker on day t . This leads to a game played by an inﬁnite sequence of players.
In their well-known paper Doing it now or later, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) consider a decision maker who has to 
decide when to execute a certain task. One important feature of their model is an exogenous deadline: once the deadline is 
reached, the decision maker has no choice but to execute the task. This model can be seen as a ﬁnite centipede game and 
is a special case of our more general model. In our model, the decision maker may have the option to never quit, whence 
the title of our paper.
Following the literature on decision making with time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision 
makers, naive and sophisticated, and examine the corresponding two types of solution concepts.
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game. Thus a naive decision maker intends to follow a strategy that maximizes his payoff over the entire continuation 
game, but in reality he only carries out the ﬁrst action. This happens because the strategy that is optimal for the current 
self need not be optimal for future selves. This behavior is captured by the concept of naive equilibrium.
A sophisticated decision maker, in contrast, is fully aware that his day t self only controls the decision on day t , and 
that the future selves have different preferences. Thus in a sophisticated equilibrium each self of the decision maker best 
responds to the strategies of the future selves. Hence a sophisticated equilibrium is essentially the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the game played by the selves of the decision maker “against” each other.
An example given in Flesch et al. (2010), discussed in detail in the following section, shows that in general a sophisti-
cated equilibrium need not exist. This motivates us to consider more permissive solution concepts: naive -equilibrium and 
sophisticated -equilibrium. A naive -equilibrium is strategy proﬁle with the property that every player’s strategy can be 
supported with a belief that makes this strategy and belief combination -optimal. In a sophisticated -equilibrium each 
player is assumed to play an -best response to the strategies of the subsequent players.
Our results are as follows. We show that for each  > 0 there exists both a naive -equilibrium and a sophisticated 
-equilibrium. These existence results rely on mixed strategies. If we assume that each player’s payoff function is upper 
semicontinuous, then there exist both a naive 0-equilibrium in pure strategies and a sophisticated 0-equilibrium in pure 
strategies.
Herings and Rohde (2006) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) consider how time-inconsistent decision makers interact in a 
market environment and give suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium existence. Nevertheless, Gabrieli and Ghosal (2013) point 
out that under standard assumptions equilibria may fail to exist in such environments. The heart of the problem is the 
satiation of the induced preferences of sophisticated decision makers, and the examples of non-existence are robust. On the 
contrary, the equilibrium existence issues taken up in this paper are at the level of the individual decision maker rather 
than the interaction between decision makers and existence problems can be solved by notions of -equilibrium.
One of the key results in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is that a sophisticated decision maker executes a task earlier 
than a naive decision maker. We provide a counterpart of this result in our setup. We show that for a given sophisticated 
-equilibrium there exists a naive -equilibrium with the probability of stopping not higher than in the given sophisticated 
-equilibrium. Conversely, given a naive -equilibrium there is a sophisticated -equilibrium with the probability of stopping 
not smaller than in the given naive -equilibrium.
Apart from the literature on time-inconsistent decision making, our results contribute to the literature on the existence 
of subgame perfect -equilibrium in perfect information games, see e.g. Flesch et al. (2010), Purves and Sudderth (2011), 
and De Pril et al. (2014). For the most part, this literature focuses on games with ﬁnitely many players. In contrast, here we 
consider a class of games played by inﬁnitely many players.
Related to the inﬁnite centipede games as considered here are so-called stopping games, see Solan (2005) and 
Mashiah-Yaakovi (2009). These are dynamic games where at each period of time each player can choose to stop or to 
continue. Our work is also related to intergenerational games, where there is a sequence of players such that each player 
represents an entire generation, see Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Balbus et al. (2015).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the so-called procrastination game. The game serves to 
illustrate some of the non-trivial aspects of our analysis and to motivate the need for the solution concepts of naive 
-equilibrium and sophisticated -equilibrium. In Section 3, we introduce the general model and deﬁne naive and so-
phisticated -equilibria. In Section 4, we focus on a special class of games in which the payoffs are upper semi-continuous, 
and show the existence of naive 0-equilibrium and sophisticated 0-equilibrium in pure strategies. In Section 5, we examine 
the existence of naive -equilibrium and, in Section 6, the existence of sophisticated -equilibrium. In Section 7, we com-
pare the stopping probabilities of naive and sophisticated decision makers and show that sophisticated decision makers stop 
earlier.
2. The procrastination game
Consider a decision maker who contemplates quitting smoking. On any given day the decision maker prefers quitting 
tomorrow to quitting today, and prefers quitting today to never quitting. This is an example of a decision maker with 
time-inconsistent preferences: quitting on day 2 is the best option from the perspective of day 1, but it is no longer the 
best option once it is considered on day 2 itself.
Following the standard approach to modeling time-inconsistent preferences, we represent the decision maker by a se-
quence of different selves, where day t self makes a decision on behalf of the decision maker on day t . This leads us to 
the following game tree, where S (stop) stands for quitting smoking and C (continue) represents the option to postpone 
quitting.
For the sake of concreteness we choose the following numerical values for the payoffs: the day t self of the decision 
maker obtains a payoff of 1 if the decision maker quits on day t , a payoff of 2 if the decision maker quits on any day 
k > t , and 0 in all other situations, so in particular if the decision maker never quits. We refer to this situation as the 
Procrastination game. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) consider a decision maker who has to decide when to execute a task 
such as quitting smoking. One important feature of their model is an exogenous deadline: once the deadline is reached, the 
decision maker has no choice but to execute the task. In contrast, the decision maker acting in the procrastination game 
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above has the option to never quit. Our general model as detailed in the following section captures both cases with and 
without an exogenous deadline.
Whether the decision maker quits, and if so, when, depends on his type. Following much of the literature on time-
inconsistent decision making we distinguish two types of decision makers: naive and sophisticated.
A naive decision maker acts under the erroneous assumption that his current self controls all future decisions in the 
game. Thus a naive decision maker intends to follow a strategy that maximizes his payoff over the entire continuation 
game, but in reality only carries out the ﬁrst action. In the procrastination game, this behavior implies never quitting as the 
decision maker always intends to quit later.
A sophisticated decision maker, in contrast, is fully aware that his day t self only controls the decision on day t , and 
that future selves have different preferences. In the literature, this behavior is captured by the concept of sophisticated 
equilibrium, which essentially is nothing but a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with multiple selves.
Somewhat surprisingly, the procrastination game has no sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies, a fact already no-
ticed (without proof) in Flesch et al. (2010), who introduced this game to show that properties of games with inﬁnitely 
many players can be substantially different from those having ﬁnitely many players. For the sake of completeness, we give 
a short argument.
Claim 2.1. The procrastination game has no sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies. We distinguish three 
cases and derive a contradiction in each case. Let I be the set of players who choose action S conditional on reaching their 
decision nodes.
Case 1: Each player plays action C , so each player receives a payoff of 0. Player 1 would get a payoff of 1 by deviating 
to S .
Case 2: Exactly one player, say player t , chooses S . Since players t + 1, t + 2, . . . do not belong to I , player t + 1 receives 
a payoff of 0 in the subgame starting in time t + 1. A deviation to S gives player t + 1 a payoff of 1.
Case 3: There exist two distinct players, say t1 and t2, who are elements of I . Without loss of generality, suppose t1 < t2. 
In the subgame starting in time t1, player t1 receives a payoff of 1 but he would get 2 by deviating to C . 
We show in Claim 6.1 that the procrastination game has no sophisticated equilibrium even when mixed strategies are 
considered. Non-existence of a sophisticated equilibrium in the procrastination game motivates us to consider approximate 
solution concepts: naive -equilibrium and sophisticated -equilibrium. Under both concepts, the decision maker is as-
sumed to maximize his payoff up to a margin of  . As we demonstrate in Section 6, the procrastination game does have a 
sophisticated -equilibrium for each positive  , namely the strategy proﬁle whereby each self stops with probability  .
3. The general model
In this section, we describe inﬁnite centipede games and deﬁne two solution concepts: naive -equilibrium and sophis-
ticated -equilibrium.
In an inﬁnite centipede game G , the set of players is the set N of natural numbers and the set of actions is A = {C, S}, 
where C stands for continue and S stands for stop. The game is played as follows. At time 1, player 1 chooses an action. If 
he chooses action S , then the game ends. If he chooses action C , then the play proceeds to time 2 where player 2 chooses 
an action. This is repeated as long as players choose action C . The payoff for player i ∈ N is ait if the game ends at time t
and ai∞ if no one plays action S . We assume that payoffs are uniformly bounded, i.e.,
B = sup sup
∗
|ait | < ∞, (1)i∈N t∈N
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where N∗ stands for N∪ {∞}. By using the vector notation at = (ait)i∈N for every t ∈ N∗ , a centipede game can be repre-
sented as in Fig. 2.
Our model can easily encompass various forms of discounted utility. For instance, when for all players the choice of C
during the ﬁrst t days yields instantaneous beneﬁts bt ≥ 0 in day t , the instantaneous costs of stopping in day t are ct ≥ 0, 
after stopping no further instantaneous costs and beneﬁts occur, and player i discounts beneﬁts and costs in day t by the 
discount factor δit ∈ [0, 1], then we have
ait =
t−1∑
k=1
δikbk − δit ct .
If discounting takes the standard exponential form, δit = (δ)t for some δ ∈ (0, 1), then boundedness of the sequences bt and 
ct is suﬃcient for ai∞ =
∑∞
k=1 δikbk to be well-deﬁned and to obtain uniform boundedness as expressed in (1).
A strategy for player i is a probability distribution σ i on the set of actions {C, S}. The interpretation is that, if time i is 
reached, then σ i recommends to play C with probability σ i(C) and to play S with probability σ i(S). The set of strategies 
for player i is denoted by i and the set of strategy proﬁles is denoted by  =×i∈Ni . A strategy σ i of player i is uniquely 
speciﬁed by the probability to stop, σ i(S). Hence i can be identiﬁed with [0, 1], and  can be identiﬁed with [0, 1]N .
A strategy σ i is called pure if either σ i(S) = 0 or σ i(S) = 1. Hence a pure strategy is an element of {0, 1} and a pure 
strategy proﬁle is an element of {0, 1}N .
Let σ be a strategy proﬁle. The expected utility of player i, conditional on the game not being stopped before time t , is 
denoted by ui(σ |t) and can be calculated as:
ui(σ |t) = σ t(S) · ait +
∞∑
k=t+1
σ k(S)
k−1∏
j=t
σ j(C) · aik +
∞∏
j=t
σ j(C) · ai∞.
Note that ui(σ |i + 1) is the expected utility of player i when player i plays action C at time i.
We now deﬁne the concept of naive -equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let  ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle τ ∗ ∈  is called a naive -equilibrium if there exists a sequence (τi)i∈N of strategy 
proﬁles satisfying the following two conditions:
1. τ ∗,i = τ ii for every player i ∈N,
2. ui(τi |i) ≥ ui(σ |i) −  for every player i ∈N and every strategy proﬁle σ ∈ .
A naive 0-equilibrium is simply called a naive equilibrium.
The idea behind Deﬁnition 3.1 originates with the literature on time-inconsistent decision making. Thus suppose that, 
as in the procrastination game of the previous section, player i represents the day i self of a decision maker. The strategy 
proﬁle τi can then be thought of as the complete course of actions that the day i self intends to carry out. Condition 2 says 
that τi is an -optimal strategy proﬁle in the continuation game when evaluated against day i’s preferences.
The decision maker is naive as he fails to realize that his day i self only controls the decision on day i, and that the 
strategy proﬁle τi need not be -optimal for the future selves. As a result, the sequence of strategies that the naive decision 
maker actually carries out is (τ 11 , τ
2
2 , . . . ). This sequence is exactly τ
∗ by Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 3.1. Thus τ ∗ could be 
thought of as the realized behavior of a naive decision maker.
Naive -equilibrium could also be interpreted without a recourse to time-inconsistent decision making. It represents 
a situation in which player i fails to take into account the fact that he only controls a single decision node at time i, 
subsequent decisions being taken by other players.
For each player i ∈N, we deﬁne Ai = {aii, aii+1, . . .} ∪ {ai∞}, which is the set of possible payoffs for player i conditional on 
the fact that no player has stopped the game before him. Also, we let
Mi = sup Ai . (2)
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ui(τi |i) ≥ Mi −  for every player i ∈N. (3)
As an illustration, consider the Procrastination game in Fig. 1. In this game, Mi = 2 for each player i. It can be veriﬁed 
that the naive -equilibria are exactly those strategy proﬁles τ ∗ for which τ ∗,i(C) ≥ 1 −  for each player i.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let  ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ ∗ ∈  is called a sophisticated -equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N and each 
strategy σ i ∈ i :
ui(σ ∗|i) ≥ ui((σ i,σ ∗,−i)|i) − .
A sophisticated 0-equilibrium is simply called a sophisticated equilibrium.
A sophisticated decision maker is fully aware that his day i self only controls the decision on day i and that the future 
selves may have different preferences. Thus in a sophisticated -equilibrium each self of the decision maker -best responds 
to the strategies of the future selves. Hence a sophisticated -equilibrium is essentially a subgame perfect -equilibrium of 
the game.
If player i’s opponents play according to σ ∗,−i and player i chooses action C at time i, then his payoff is ui(σ ∗|i + 1), 
whereas if player i chooses action S , then his payoff is aii . Hence, a strategy proﬁle σ
∗ is a sophisticated -equilibrium if 
and only if σ ∗ satisﬁes the following two inequalities for every player i:
ui(σ ∗|i) ≥ ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − , (4)
ui(σ ∗|i) ≥ aii − . (5)
In our illustrative example, the Procrastination game in Fig. 1, there is no sophisticated -equilibrium in pure strategies 
for  ∈ [0, 1) and no sophisticated equilibrium as we will show in Section 6. On the other hand, for  > 0, we will pro-
vide a proof that this game does admit a sophisticated -equilibrium in mixed strategies, where each player stops with 
probability  .
4. Existence of equilibrium in the upper semicontinuous case
In this section, we establish the existence of naive and sophisticated equilibria if the payoffs in the game are upper 
semi-continuous, i.e., if for every player i ∈N
limsup
t→∞
ait ≤ ai∞. (6)
The payoffs of player i are upper semi-continuous if the payoffs of player i when stopping the game at time t with t
going to inﬁnity are less than or equal to the payoffs obtained when never stopping the game. A typical example of payoffs 
that are upper semi-continuous but not continuous concerns the case where stopping the game corresponds to making 
a costly investment, say for instance in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. Making the investment too late leaves 
too little time to recoup the costs or would not change a disastrous outcome. In such a case, not making the investment 
at all would be preferred to making the investment at a very late point in time. Another example of payoffs that are 
upper semi-continuous but not continuous results when stopping corresponds to giving in and the player derives a positive 
psychological beneﬁt from never doing so. Continuity, and therefore upper semi-continuity, is satisﬁed in the standard model 
of exponential discounting when instantaneous costs and beneﬁts are uniformly bounded.
First, we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of naive equilibrium without continuity assump-
tions on the payoffs.
Theorem 4.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For every player i ∈N, the set Ai = {aii, aii+1, . . .} ∪ {ai∞} has a maximum.
(ii) There exists a naive equilibrium in pure strategies.
(iii) There exists a naive equilibrium.
Proof. (i → ii) Consider a player i. If the maximum of Ai is ai∞ , then let τi be the pure strategy proﬁle that always chooses 
action C . If the maximum of Ai is not ai∞ , but some ait with t ∈ N, then let τi be the pure strategy proﬁle that always 
chooses action C , except at time t , where it chooses action S . It is clear that the pure strategy proﬁle τ ∗ deﬁned by 
τ ∗,i = τ ii for every i ∈N is a naive equilibrium.
(ii → iii) Obvious.
(iii → i) Suppose that there exists a naive equilibrium. Take a player i. By (3), there exists a strategy proﬁle τi such that 
ui(τi |i) ≥ Mi . It follows from (2) that ui(τi |i) = Mi and that there exists a t ∈ {i, i + 1, . . .} ∪ {∞} such that ait = Mi . Thus, 
the set Ai has a maximum. 
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we will consider later. However, we have the following existence result for games with upper semicontinuous payoffs.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a naive equilibrium in pure strategies if the payoffs are upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Due to (6), the set Ai = {aii, aii+1, . . .} ∪ {ai∞} has a maximum for every player i ∈N. Therefore, by Theorem 4.1, there 
exists a naive equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Now we turn to the existence of a sophisticated equilibrium. The proof of the following result employs a truncation 
approach similar to that in Fudenberg and Levine (1983). One crucial difference however is that we do not assume the 
payoffs to be continuous, but only upper semicontinuous.
Theorem 4.3. There exists a sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies if the payoffs are upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Consider a centipede game G . For every T ∈ N, we deﬁne the T -period truncated game GT which is identical to G
except for one modiﬁcation: if all players 1, . . . , T choose to continue, then, regardless of future play, the payoff of each 
player i ∈N is equal to aiT+1. Since the payoffs cannot change after time T , this game is essentially a T -period game.
For every T ∈ N, the truncated game GT admits a pure sophisticated equilibrium σT in which σ iT (S) = 1 for every 
player i ≥ T + 1. Indeed, due to the payoffs in GT , we can set σ iT (S) = 1 for every player i ≥ T + 1 and then determine 
σ TT (S), . . . , σ
1
T (S) by backward induction. If a player is indifferent between playing action C and action S then either action 
can be taken. The set of pure strategy proﬁles, as mentioned earlier, can be identiﬁed with the inﬁnite Cartesian prod-
uct {0, 1}N and is thus a compact metrizable topological space. Hence the sequence (σT )∞T=1 has an accumulation point 
σ¯ ∈ {0, 1}N . By taking a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that (σT )∞T=1 converges to the strategy proﬁle σ¯ . We 
distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Suppose that there are only ﬁnitely many players who play action S in the strategy proﬁle σ¯ . So, there exists a 
time t such that for all players i ≥ t , σ¯ i(C) = 1. We prove that σ¯ induces a sophisticated equilibrium for the subgame of G
starting at time t . So we need to show that ui(σ¯ |i) ≥ aii for all i ≥ t . For every i, T ∈N, let
miT = min{k ≥ i|σ kT (S) = 1},
so miT is the ﬁrst player at time i or later who stops in the strategy proﬁle σT . We have for every i ≥ t that
ui(σ¯ |i) = ai∞ (7)
≥ limsup
T→∞
aiT (8)
≥ limsup
T→∞
ai
miT
(9)
= limsup
T→∞
ui(σT |i) (10)
≥ aii . (11)
Equality (7) holds, since no one stops from time t onwards in the strategy proﬁle σ¯ ; (8) follows from the assumption of 
the theorem; (9) follows from the deﬁnition of limit superior, because miT → ∞ as T → ∞, for every i ≥ t; (10) holds as 
ui(σT |i) = aimiT for every i and T ; and ﬁnally (11) is true since σT is a sophisticated equilibrium in GT . Hence, we have 
ui(σ¯ |i) ≥ aii for all i ≥ t , as desired. This means that σ¯ induces a sophisticated equilibrium for the subgame of G starting at 
time t . Now we can use backward induction from time t to obtain a sophisticated equilibrium in G .
Case 2: Suppose that there are inﬁnitely many players who play action S in the strategy proﬁle σ¯ . Take an arbitrary 
player i. Let
ni = min{k > i|σ¯ k(S) = 1},
so ni is the ﬁrst player at time i + 1 or later who stops in the strategy proﬁle σ¯ . Since (σT )∞T=1 converges to σ¯ , there exists 
T ≥ ni such that for all j ≤ ni we have σ jT = σ¯ j . Because σT is a sophisticated equilibrium in the game GT , player i does 
not have a proﬁtable deviation from σT in GT . It follows that player i does not have a proﬁtable deviation from σ¯ in the 
game G . We conclude that σ¯ is a sophisticated equilibrium of G . 
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5. Existence of naive -equilibrium
We know from the previous section that a naive equilibrium does not always exist. The following theorem deals with 
the existence of naive -equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. For every  > 0, there exists a naive -equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Let  > 0 be given. Consider a player i. We distinguish two cases in order to deﬁne a pure strategy proﬁle τi .
Case 1: ai∞ ≥ Mi −  , where Mi is given in (2). In this case, let τi be the pure strategy proﬁle that always chooses 
action C .
Case 2: ai∞ < Mi −  . In this case, there exists t ∈ {i, i + 1, . . .} such that ait ≥ Mi −  . Let τi be the pure strategy proﬁle 
that always chooses action C , except at time t , where it chooses action S .
Now deﬁne the pure strategy proﬁle τ ∗ by setting τ ∗,i = τ ii for every player i ∈N. Then, the strategy proﬁles τ ∗ and τi , 
for every i ∈N, satisfy Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 3.1 and inequality (3), so τ ∗ is a naive -equilibrium. 
As an illustration, consider a game where the payoff for player i ∈ N is 1 − 1/(t − i + 1) if the game ends at time t > i, 
and 0 if the game ends at time t ≤ i or if no one stops. The game is given in Fig. 3.
By Theorem 4.1, there is no naive equilibrium in this game. On the other hand, the pure strategy proﬁle τ ∗ that always 
chooses action C is a naive -equilibrium for every  > 0. Indeed, let  > 0. For every player i, take a time ti such that ti > i
and aiti ≥ 1 −  . Deﬁne τi to be the pure strategy proﬁle that always chooses action C , except at time ti , where it chooses 
action S . Then, for every player i ∈N it holds that τ ∗,i = τ ii and inequality (3) is satisﬁed, so τ ∗ is a naive -equilibrium as 
claimed. Notice also that the strategy proﬁle τ ∗ is a sophisticated equilibrium of the game.
6. Existence of sophisticated -equilibrium
In this section, we examine the existence of a sophisticated -equilibrium. The following claim establishes that the 
Procrastination game has neither a sophisticated equilibrium nor a pure sophisticated -equilibrium.
Claim 6.1. The Procrastination game in Fig. 1 has the following properties:
1. It admits no sophisticated -equilibrium in pure strategies for any  ∈ [0, 1).
2. It admits no sophisticated equilibrium.
Proof. First we prove part 1. Take an  ∈ [0, 1) and suppose by way of contradiction that σ is a sophisticated -equilibrium 
in pure strategies. Consider some player i ∈ N. For any pure strategy τ i it holds that ui(σ |i) ≥ ui((τ i, σ−i)|i) −  . Because 
pure strategy proﬁles can only induce payoffs 0, 1 or 2 to any player in the game and because  < 1, we must have 
ui(σ |i) ≥ ui((τ i, σ−i)|i). Therefore, pure strategy proﬁle σ is a sophisticated equilibrium. This contradicts Claim 2.1.
Now we prove part 2. Assume to the contrary that σ is a sophisticated equilibrium. For every player k, let
p(σ |k) =
∞∏
i=k
σ i(C)
be the probability that the game never stops, provided that it has not been stopped before time k and that the players play 
according to σ .
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have ui((C, σ−i)|i) = ui((S, σ−i)|i). Note that ui((S, σ−i)|i) = 1 and
ui((C,σ−i)|i) = (1− p(σ |i + 1)) · 2,
so p(σ |i + 1) = 0.5. By a similar argument, we obtain for player j that p(σ | j + 1) = 0.5. But then
p(σ |i + 1) = σ i+1(C)σ i+2(C) · · ·σ j(C)p(σ | j + 1)
yields σ j(C) = 1, which is a contradiction to the fact that σ j is not pure.
Therefore, there is a time t such that in the subgame that starts at t , the strategy proﬁle σ is a sophisticated equilibrium 
in pure strategies. By backward induction, we can then construct a sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies for the whole 
game. This is however in contradiction with Claim 2.1. 
The main result of this section is the following theorem on the existence of a sophisticated -equilibrium.
Theorem 6.2. For every  > 0, there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium.
Proof. Take a centipede game G . Recall the deﬁnition of B from (1). Choose a number δ so that 0 < δ ≤ min{ 2B , 1}. Deﬁne 
the normal-form game G∗ as the game with set of players N, set of strategies for player i ∈ N equal to
∗i = {σ i ∈ i | σ i(S) ∈ [δ,1]},
and utility function vi of player i ∈N deﬁned by
vi(σ ) = ui(σ | i)
for each σ in ∗ = ×i∈N∗i . The strategy sets of all players are non-empty, convex, and compact. Each player’s utility 
function is aﬃne, so quasi-concave, in that player’s own strategy, since
vi(σ ) = σ i(S)aii + (1− σ i(S))ui(σ |i + 1), (12)
where ui(σ |i + 1) is unaffected by the strategy σ i of player i. Crucially, each player’s utility function is continuous on ∗ . 
The key to the continuity of the payoff functions is that under any strategy proﬁle in ∗ , the probability that no one ever 
stops is zero.
The game G∗ therefore has a Nash equilibrium, say σ ∗ , by Theorem 6.2 of Peleg and Yaari (1973). In view of equation 
(12), if ui(σ ∗|i + 1) < aii then σ ∗,i(S) = 1, and if ui(σ ∗|i + 1) > aii then σ ∗,i(S) = δ.
We show that σ ∗ is a sophisticated -equilibrium of G . Take any player i ∈ N. If ui(σ ∗|i + 1) < aii then σ ∗,i(S) = 1, 
so ui(σ ∗|i) = vi(σ ∗) = aii and (4) and (5) are satisﬁed. If ui(σ ∗|i + 1) = aii then ui(σ ∗|i) = vi(σ ∗) = aii , so (4) and (5) are 
satisﬁed. So assume that ui(σ ∗|i + 1) > aii . We have that σ ∗,i(S) = δ, so
ui(σ ∗|i) = vi(σ ∗)
= σ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− σ ∗,i(S))ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
= δ aii + (1− δ)ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
= δ(aii − ui(σ ∗|i + 1)) + ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
≥ −δ2B + ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
≥ ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − .
Hence, inequality (4) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, it holds that
ui(σ ∗|i) − aii = vi(σ ∗) − aii
= σ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− σ ∗,i(S))ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − aii
= (1− σ ∗,i(S))(ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − aii)
≥ 0,
where the inequality follows by ui(σ ∗|i + 1) > aii . Hence, inequality (5) is also satisﬁed. 
We remark that one could give a direct proof of the theorem using truncations of the game tree. To do so, let GT be 
the game as in the proof of Theorem 4.3. One could show that GT has a sophisticated -equilibrium σT that is an element 
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of ∗ . One can further show that any accumulation point of the sequence {σT }T∈N is a sophisticated -equilibrium of the 
original game G .
According to the deﬁnition of B in (1), the payoffs are uniformly bounded. One might wonder whether it would be 
enough to assume only that the payoffs are bounded for each player separately. The following example shows that this 
weaker assumption would not suﬃce for the existence of a sophisticated -equilibrium.
Consider the game with the following payoffs for every player i: If the game ends before time i then player i’s payoff 
is 0. If the game ends at time i then player i’s payoff is 2i . If the game ends after time i then player i’s payoff is 2i+1. 
Finally, if the game never ends then player i’s payoff is 0. The game tree is given in Fig. 4.
It is clear that, for each i ∈N, sup
t∈N∗
|ait | = 2i+1. At the same time it holds that sup
i∈N
sup
t∈N∗
|ait | = ∞.
Claim 6.3. For each  > 0, the game in Fig. 4 admits no sophisticated -equilibrium.
Proof. Take  > 0 and suppose by way of contradiction that there is a sophisticated -equilibrium σ for the game in Fig. 4. 
As in the proof of Claim 6.1, let p(σ |k) =∏∞i=k σ i(C) denote the probability that the game never stops, given that it has not 
stopped before time k and the players follow the strategy proﬁle σ .
Take a player i ∈ N. Since σ is a sophisticated -equilibrium, inequality (5) implies that ui(σ |i) ≥ 2i −  . On the other 
hand, since 2i+1 is the highest payoff player i can get and since he gets 0 if the game never stops, we have the following 
upper bound on the payoff: ui(σ |i) ≤ (1 − p(σ |i)) · 2i+1 + p(σ |i) · 0. Combining these facts and rearranging terms, we ﬁnd 
that
p(σ |i) ≤ 1
2
+ 
2i+1
.
Notice that the sequence {p(σ |i)}i∈N is non-decreasing and bounded and hence has a limit. Furthermore, the preceding 
inequality implies that
lim
i→∞
p(σ |i) ≤ 1
2
.
Consider any player i ∈N. For each j > i it holds that
p(σ |i) =
∞∏
t=i
σ t(C) =
j−1∏
t=i
σ t(C) · p(σ | j).
Taking the limit as j approaches inﬁnity, we obtain
p(σ |i) = lim
j→∞
j−1∏
t=i
σ t(C) · lim
j→∞
p(σ | j) = p(σ |i) · lim
j→∞
p(σ | j) ≤ p(σ |i) · 1
2
,
which implies that p(σ |i) = 0.
Thus for each i ∈N it holds that ui(σ |i) = σ i(S) · 2i + (1 −σ i(S)) · 2i+1 and ui(σ |i + 1) = 2i+1. Since σ is a sophisticated 
-equilibrium, it holds by inequality (4) that ui(σ |i) ≥ ui(σ |i + 1) −  , and therefore σ i(S) ≤ 2−i .
Now take t ∈ N such that 21−t < 1. Since 1 − p(σ |t) is the probability that the game eventually stops conditional on 
time t being reached, we have
1− p(σ |t) =
∞∑
j=t
σ j(S)
j−1∏
i=t
σ i(C) ≤
∞∑
j=t
σ j(S) ≤
∞∑
j=t
2− j ≤ 21−t,
so p(σ |t) ≥ 1 − 21−t > 0, contradicting p(σ |t) = 0. 
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One of the key results in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is that a sophisticated decision maker executes a task earlier 
than a naive decision maker. In this section we derive the counterpart of this result in our setup. The comparison of 
sophisticated and naive decision makers in our setup is somewhat complicated by the fact that in general there might exist 
multiple sophisticated -equilibria and multiple naive -equilibria. We thus have to compare two sets of equilibria. We 
achieve this by showing that [1] given a sophisticated -equilibrium there exists a naive -equilibrium with the probability 
to stop not greater than in the sophisticated -equilibrium at any given time, and [2] given a naive -equilibrium there 
exists a sophisticated -equilibrium with the probability to stop not smaller than in the naive -equilibrium at any given 
time.
We restrict attention to the case  > 0 to guarantee the existence of naive and sophisticated -equilibria. Indeed, recall 
that the Procrastination game of section 2 has no sophisticated equilibrium (see Claim 6.1), while it does admit a naive 
equilibrium, namely playing C at every period. The game depicted in Fig. 3 admits a sophisticated equilibrium but not a 
naive equilibrium.
Theorem 7.1. Let some  > 0 be given. For each sophisticated -equilibrium σ ∗, there exists a naive -equilibrium τ ∗ such that for all 
i ∈N, τ ∗,i(S) ≤ σ ∗,i(S).
Proof. Let σ ∗ be a sophisticated -equilibrium. For every i ∈N, we deﬁne the strategy proﬁle τi ∈  as follows. If ui(σ ∗|i) ≥
Mi −  , then let τi = σ ∗ . Otherwise, it holds that ui(σ ∗|i) < Mi −  . As aii −  ≤ ui(σ ∗|i) by inequality (5), it then holds 
that aii < M
i . Consequently, there exists t ∈ {i + 1, i + 2, . . . } ∪ {∞} such that ait ≥ Mi −  . If t = ∞ then we deﬁne τi by 
letting τ ji (S) = 0 for all j ∈N, while if t ∈ {i + 1, i + 2, . . . } we deﬁne τ ti (S) = 1 and τ ji (S) = 0 for all j 	= t . It is easy to see 
that the strategy proﬁle τi satisﬁes inequality (3). Now deﬁne τ ∗ ∈  by letting τ ∗,i = τ ii for each i ∈N. Then τ ∗ is a naive 
-equilibrium. Since τ ∗,i(S) is either equal to σ ∗,i(S) or 0, it holds for every i ∈N that τ ∗,i(S) ≤ σ ∗,i(S). 
Theorem 7.2. Let some  > 0 be given. For each naive -equilibrium τ ∗, there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium σ ∗ such that for all 
i ∈N, τ ∗,i(S) ≤ σ ∗,i(S).
Proof. Fix a naive -equilibrium τ ∗ and let (τi)i∈N be as in Deﬁnition 3.1. Choose a number δ so that 0 < δ ≤ min{ 2B , 1}. 
For i ∈N let π i = max{δ, τ ∗,i(S)}. Deﬁne the normal-form game G∗∗ as the game with set of players N, set of strategies for 
player i ∈N equal to
∗∗i = {σ i ∈ i | σ i(S) ∈ [π i,1]},
and utility function vi of player i ∈N deﬁned by
vi(σ ) = ui(σ | i)
for each σ in ∗∗ = ×i∈N∗∗i . The strategy sets of all players are non-empty, convex, and compact. The utility functions of 
all players are continuous on ∗∗ and aﬃne, so quasi-concave, in their own strategy. The game G∗∗ therefore has a Nash 
equilibrium, say σ ∗ , by Theorem 6.2 of Peleg and Yaari (1973). The payoff functions can be written as
vi(σ ) = σ i(S)aii + (1− σ i(S))ui(σ |i + 1),
where ui(σ |i + 1) is unaffected by the strategy σ i of player i. It follows that if ui(σ ∗|i + 1) < aii then σ ∗,i(S) = 1, and if 
ui(σ ∗|i + 1) > aii then σ ∗,i(S) = π i .
We show that σ ∗ is a sophisticated -equilibrium of G .
Take any player i ∈ N. If ui(σ ∗|i + 1) < aii then σ ∗,i(S) = 1, so ui(σ ∗|i) = vi(σ ∗) = aii and (4) and (5) are satisﬁed. If 
ui(σ ∗|i + 1) = aii then ui(σ ∗|i) = vi(σ ∗) = aii , so (4) and (5) are satisﬁed. So assume that ui(σ ∗|i + 1) > aii . We have that 
σ ∗,i(S) = π i .
If π i = δ, then
ui(σ ∗|i) = vi(σ ∗)
= σ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− σ ∗,i(S))ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
= δ aii + (1− δ)ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
≥ −δ2B + ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
≥ ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − .
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ui(σ ∗|i) − ui(σ ∗|i + 1) = σ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− σ ∗,i(S))ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − ui(σ ∗|i + 1)
= σ ∗,i(S)(aii − ui(σ ∗|i + 1))
= τ ∗,i(S)(aii − ui(σ ∗|i + 1)) (13)
≥ τ ∗,i(S)(aii − Mi) (14)
= τ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− τ ∗,i(S))Mi − Mi
≥ τ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− τ ∗,i(S))ui(τi|i + 1) − Mi (15)
= ui(τi|i) − Mi
≥ −, (16)
where equality (13) holds since we assume σ ∗,i(S) = π i = τ ∗,i(S). Inequality (14) holds since ui(σ ∗|i + 1) is an expectation 
of the payoffs under a probability distribution over the set {aii+1, aii+2, · · · } ∪ {ai∞}, a subset of Ai , and hence is bounded 
above by Mi = sup Ai . Inequality (15) follows since ui(τi |i +1) is likewise bounded above by Mi , and inequality (16) follows 
from inequality (3).
Hence, σ ∗ satisﬁes inequality (4).
Moreover, we have
ui(σ ∗|i) − aii = σ ∗,i(S)aii + (1− σ ∗,i(S))ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − aii
= (1− σ ∗,i(S))(ui(σ ∗|i + 1) − aii)
≥ 0,
so inequality (5) is also satisﬁed. 
Notice that the Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 do not preclude the possibility that there exist a naive -equilibrium τ ∗ and a 
sophisticated -equilibrium σ ∗ such that τ ∗,i(S) > σ ∗,i(S) for all i ∈N. The trivial game where all payoffs are 0 would yield 
an example.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined inﬁnite centipede games with uniformly bounded payoffs. We have looked at two 
solution concepts, naive and sophisticated -equilibria, depending on the type of the decision maker.
Regarding a naive decision maker, we show that there does not always exist a naive 0-equilibrium. We provide the 
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a naive 0-equilibrium and show that upper semicontinuity of payoffs 
is suﬃcient for existence. Finally, we show that a naive -equilibrium always exists, for any  > 0.
For a sophisticated decision maker, we also show that sophisticated equilibria do not always exist. We show the existence 
of a sophisticated 0-equilibrium in pure strategies when payoffs are upper semicontinuous. Moreover, we show that for 
every  > 0, there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium.
We also examine the connection between naive and sophisticated decision makers. Let some  > 0 be given. We show 
that for every sophisticated -equilibrium there exists a naive -equilibrium such that the stopping probability of every 
player in the sophisticated -equilibrium strategy is higher than in the naive -equilibrium strategy. Additionally, we show 
that for every naive -equilibrium there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium such that the stopping probability of every 
player in the sophisticated -equilibrium strategy is higher than in the naive -equilibrium.
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